By Evans Ufeli Esq
Section 8(2) of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution (as amended) frames boundary adjustments for existing states and local government areas as a deliberate, multi‑step constitutional exercise. It requires a referendum in the affected territory, approval by two‑thirds of the relevant local government councils, and enactment by the National Assembly. The architecture is conservative by design: the Constitution disperses authority across local, state and federal levels so that alterations to political geography cannot be imposed by a single actor or through narrow majorities. The result is a process that is legalistic, politically demanding and inherently consensual.
It is important to distinguish this process from the constitutional procedures for creating a new state. Although both undertakings are politically sensitive and constitutionally regulated, they have different initiation dynamics and thresholds at various stages. Creation of a state and alteration of internal boundaries are therefore distinct, and each requires careful compliance with the specific provisions that apply. One common implication is that unilateral or parochial initiatives are unlikely to succeed unless they are embedded in a broader coalition of stakeholders and compliant with the prescribed steps.
The proposal for an Anioma state and remarks attributed to Senator Ned Nwoko illustrates how easily proponents can underestimate these requirements. Boundary adjustment is not the private project of a single senator, however prominent. Any credible boundary alteration will implicate other Delta State lawmakers, the Delta State House of Assembly, local government councils within the affected area, and the electorate in a binding referendum. Failure to secure broad-based consent at the state and local levels undermines both the constitutional legitimacy and the political feasibility of the campaign.
Practically speaking, there are several reasons why signatures, endorsements and active cooperation from other Delta lawmakers and institutions matter. First, representatives and senators whose constituencies would be affected possess electoral legitimacy and the local networks necessary to mobilize votes in a referendum. Second, the two‑thirds approval by local government councils is a constitutional requirement: without the affirmative resolutions of those councils, an enabling bill cannot properly proceed. Third, state institutions, especially the House of Assembly are key interlocutors in negotiating boundary lines and defusing intra‑state tensions that might otherwise be litigated or exploited politically. Finally, a National Assembly vote is far easier to obtain when the affected state’s entire delegation presents a united front rather than a fractured one.
There are also procedural and legal risks attached to bypassing these actors. Bills or referenda framed without demonstrable local and state endorsement invite judicial challenge on grounds of noncompliance with constitutional prerequisites or inadequate consultation. Politically, a proposal perceived as top‑down or driven by a narrow clique can provoke popular resistance, intercommunal friction, and reputational damage that imperil the long‑term viability of any new arrangement.
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For proponents of Anioma state who are serious about achieving a lawful and durable outcome, the necessary roadmap is clear, if demanding. Build an inclusive coalition that embraces all Delta State federal lawmakers and the state legislature; secure affirmative resolutions from the requisite two‑thirds of local government councils; mount comprehensive civic education so that an eventual referendum reflects informed choices; and prepare for legal scrutiny by documenting compliance with constitutional procedures. Equally important is transparent negotiation around boundary demarcations to minimize dispute and to protect minority interests within affected communities.
In short, constitutional boundary alteration is a collective enterprise, not a solitary initiative. Section 8(2) places the final say, in significant measure, in the hands of affected communities and their local institutions, with the National Assembly performing the ultimate legislative function. Any meaningful attempt to redraw boundaries in Delta State must therefore recognize and secure the consent of Delta’s broader legislative family and local councils before it can hope to pass constitutional muster and enjoy lasting popular acceptance.
